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In this essay, I explore the issue of transgender/nonbinary/gender nonconforming 
(henceforth referred to as TNBGNC) oppression and exclusion through a philosophical lens. To 
do so, I use the notion of personhood. I ask the question: How are TNBGNC individuals excluded 
from personhood and its associated rights? To be a person is the first qualification for rights such 
as political involvement and social inclusion. I argue that societal conceptions of personhood are 
rooted in the gender binary, and that sexual difference and gender performance are essential for 
recognition as a person worthy of such rights. Therefore, TNBGNC oppression and exclusion is 
not an issue that can be solved with mere policy change and superficial acceptance; rather, 
personhood itself and what it means to be a human person must be reconstructed in a way that is 
not conditioned upon gender performance and sexual difference. For the purposes of this paper, I 
focus specifically on the ways in which personhood as we know it is flawed; I do not, however, 
address how exactly we might restructure personhood as such. I leave that issue for a future 






















What does it mean to be a person? The answer to this question holds the weight of life and 
death, inclusion and ostracization, domination and subordination. Those in the position of 
answering it hold power over the social destinies and political validity of billions. Philosophers 
have concerned themselves with its elusive answer for centuries, positing various measures of 
consciousness, ability, and biology as answers.  I intend to demonstrate one crucial and often 
overlooked feature of personhood as we know it: gender. 
 It was not until 2020 that the APA endorsed the use of the singular they in academic 
writing,1 and even this formal approval is not enough for some academics (many even still default 
to the masculine pronoun).  What does this say about collective ideas about persons? It shows, at 
the very least, that it is uncomfortable, if not impossible, for many to imagine a hypothetical person 
as genderless. 
 Consider, for example, the common practice of referring to God as he/him. If any being 
should be thought of as genderless, it surely seems it would be God—it is hard to see how a 
disembodied being is gendered/sexed. If even our God(s) are gendered because we cannot help but 
think in gendered subjectivity, then an actual human person as genderless is so much more difficult 
to conceive. If this is true, then those who do not conform to the rules of the gender binary, whether 
that be through transness, gender nonconformity, or rejection of the binary itself, face oppression 
and exclusion not just on account of individual prejudice, but on a fundamental level: hegemonic 
 
1 Chelsea Lee, “Welcome, Singular ‘They,’” American Psychological Association (American Psychological 
Association, October 31, 2019), https://apastyle.apa.org/blog. 
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conceptions of personhood2 necessarily exclude them from the rights and privileges that 
personhood provides. 
An exceedingly brief introduction to personhood 
 Before we can understand how personhood is gendered and its problematic aspects, we 
must grasp the importance of the concept itself. Personhood and its qualifying characteristics are 
fundamental to moral and political philosophy. While the category “human” is often assumed to 
be interchangeable with “person,” for philosophical purposes it is important to distinguish between 
the two. Personhood relies on a set of characteristics beyond mere human biology, though the 
specifics of these characteristics are disputed. 
 Discussions about the morality of abortion is one such case where the distinction between 
human and person is essential. Mary Anne Warren argues that genetic humanity is not sufficient 
for moral humanity, and that “the moral community consists… of all persons, rather than of all 
genetically human entities.”3 From this argument it follows that being a person is not necessarily 
identical to being a human, and even that being a human is not necessary for being a person.4 
Warren claims that fetuses do not possess such necessary characteristics of personhood 
(specifically, the ability to participate in a moral community)5 and therefore are not entitled to the 
same rights as the person in whose womb they reside.  
 
2 Clarification: the hegemonic conception of personhood to which I refer is one entrenched in and constructed by 
millennia of colonialism, imperialism, and patriarchy as it exists in the “western” tradition. My focus, therefore, is 
with personhood in post-colonial and European-adjacent society.  
3 Steven M. Cahn, Andrew T. Forcehimes, and Mary Anne Warren, “Exploring Moral Problems: an Introductory 
Anthology,” in Exploring Moral Problems: an Introductory Anthology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2018), pp. 584-599, 589. 
4 Surely we can imagine a case where human beings encounter some nonhuman, alien species which possesses all 
the intelligence, empathy, and other relevant characteristics of a human person. It would make sense to call this alien 
a person as well. 
5 Steven M. Cahn, Andrew T. Forcehimes, and Mary Anne Warren, “Exploring Moral Problems: an Introductory 
Anthology,” in Exploring Moral Problems: an Introductory Anthology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2018), pp. 584-599, 586. 
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 While Warren’s functional definition of personhood relies mainly on capacity for moral 
participation, other philosophers prefer different standards for determining personhood. Harry 
Frankfurt also claims that personhood is not a necessary characteristic of all human beings, but he 
claims that “one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the 
structure of a person’s will.”6 For Frankfurt, this means that the ability for an individual to reflect 
upon their desires and rationally determine their will is what makes them a person. For example, I 
may have the desire to eat because I am hungry, but I can reflect on that desire and choose to eat 
later, perhaps because I have dinner plans with a friend. A dog, when it is hungry and presented 
with food, does not reflect on its desire to eat; it just eats.  
 There are many additional arguments that purport to elucidate the necessary conditions for 
personhood. My brief mention of the above few serves not to endorse one or another, but rather to 
demonstrate two things: firstly, that personhood and humanness are not interchangeable concepts, 
and secondly, that most traditional philosophical literature on personhood indicates that when we 
consider who is a person and who is not, we tend to rely on assessments of the mind to do so, 
whether this be through moral ability, rational ability, consciousness or perceptive ability, or some 
combination of the above.  
 Which specific qualities of the mind make a person are not the concern of this paper. I take 
that there are some for granted and leave other philosophers to determine their specifics. Instead, 
I argue that when we consider personhood and those who enjoy its rights and privileges, we omit 
an important piece of the discussion. Personhood, as we experience it materially and regulate it 
ideologically, is gendered, and an explanation for its genderedness is owed and overdue. In the 
following section, I forgo the traditional discussion of personhood and instead demonstrate how 
 
6  Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 
(January 14, 1971): pp. 5-20, https://doi.org/10.2307/2024717, 6. 
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exactly personhood is gendered and what that means for individuals who exist outside the 
(cis)gender binary.  
Personhood as subordinating tool 
 While discussions of personhood based on rational or moral ability tend to dominate 
contemporary ethics, it is important to acknowledge the functional reality of personhood and how 
it has been used as a tool for oppression. Without this perspective, we would have no grasp on its 
importance today. Perhaps the most consequential and violent use of personhood in recent history 
was its role in justifying and enforcing the enslavement of Black people in the United States.7  
 Persons have the right to property; persons cannot be property. Therefore, human beings 
legally considered property are not eligible to be persons at all. The institution of slavery in the 
Americas legally deprived enslaved humans of personhood status: enslaved individuals counted 
for only ⅗ of a person for census purposes, and courts ruled against the attempts of the enslaved 
to sue for their freedom on the basis that they did not count as persons and therefore did not have 
the right to sue.8 Furthermore, the non-personhood of the enslaved effectively justified their 
subordination in the minds of slaveholders: pseudoscientific claims of innate inferiority of African 
people justified their nonperson status and therefore their enslavement. The racialization of 
personhood allowed white supremacists to rationalize the subordination and enslavement of 
nonwhites.  
 The racialization of personhood is a topic which requires its own essay. I mention it here 
only to emphasize the importance of personhood not just as a category of individuals, but as a tool 
 
7 The U.S was not the only country to engage in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, but I focus on it specifically here 
because of the specific weaponization of personhood in its justification. 
8 Jennifer Szalai, “Remembering the Enslaved Who Sued for Freedom Before the Civil War,” The New York Times 
(The New York Times, November 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/. 
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of subordination and exclusion. Who counts as a person is a matter of justice: as legal cases such 
as those of enslaved Americans show, personhood is a prerequisite for justice at all.  
Gender for dummies 
 Before discussing how the gender binary is essential to the concept of personhood as it 
functions in society, a brief explanation is required: specifically, an introduction to the gender 
binary in layperson’s terms and how TNBGNC individuals threaten it. Most people at this point 
are familiar with the sex/gender distinction. A fairly traditional interpretation of the relationship 
between sex and gender looks like this: sex is the biological reality, the concrete binary upon which 
gender is socially constructed. There are males, and the category “man” is derived from maleness, 
while the category “woman” is derived from the female sex. Individuals are classified as female 
or male based on whether they possess biological traits which signify femaleness or maleness. 
These sex categories are seen as pre-social and pre-theoretical; they exist as facts of nature. Gender 
is the social meaning we ascribe to the preexisting sex binary. Under this view, gender is a social 
construction, and sex is not.  
 However, recent sociological literature has shown that this is not the case. The claim that 
sex is concrete and pretheoretical is false. Sex is, and has always been, constructed by notions of 
gender. The ownership of a penis or a vagina, the possession of XX or XY chromosomes, amounts 
of certain hormones and other physical traits have all been assumed to be proof of distinct, 
unwavering sexual categories. The view that sex is inherent to the body omits the reality of many 
individuals who live with chromosomal, hormonal, or physical “deviations” form the norm.9 The 
practice of doctors and guardians prescribing, rather than identifying, a sex to newborn infants is 
not as uncommon as most think: Lisa Wade writes that “In the U.S. today, when infants are born 
 
9 Planned Parenthood estimates that one to two people out of 100 are born intersex each year. That is around 
49,717,392 people in the United States today. 
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with ambiguous genitalia, surgeons often operate in order to bring the child’s body into accordance 
with our expectations for “correct” male or female genitalia, even when the actual morphology of 
their bodies causes no dysfunction or harm.”10 
 What biological sex is and what physiological traits make someone male or female are 
determined in a gendered society, and this genderedness of thought is a prerequisite to claims about 
sex categories. This is not to say that sexual dimorphism is neither real nor relevant, but rather, as 
Judith Butler writes, that “sexual difference is the site where a question concerning the relation of 
the biological to the cultural is posed and reposed, where it must and can be posed, but where it 
cannot, strictly speaking, be answered.”11 
There is much more to be said about the sex/gender relation which exceeds the parameters 
of this paper. That gender exists as a massively influential organizing schematic in contemporary 
society which purports to derive from innate sexual categories is enough premise. Now, an 
introduction to identities which fall outside of the binary tradition.     
 TNBGNC refers to transgender, nonbinary, and gender nonconforming individuals. A brief 
overview of these terms will be helpful for the discussion that follows. Transgender is a “term for 
people whose gender identity and/or expression is different from what is typically associated with 
the sex they were assigned at birth.”12 By contrast, cisgender people do identify with the gender 
they were assigned at birth in accordance with their sex.  
Trans individuals may identify within the gender binary—the man/woman dichotomy—or 
somewhere in between or outside of it. For this reason, transgender is also used to describe those 
who are neither trans men nor trans women, but non-binary individuals as well. However, for the 
 
10 Lisa Wade, “The Phall-O-Meter - Sociological Images,” Sociological Images: The PhallOMeter, September 4, 
2008, https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2008/09/04/the-phall-o-meter/. 
11 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 186. 
12 “Gender Identity 101,” Beyond Gender Project, accessed May 7, 2021, http://www.beyondgenderproject.org/. 
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purposes of this paper, a distinction is made between transgender and nonbinary transgender 
individuals (and associated identities- agender, genderfluid, etc.) This is because the case could be 
made that transgender individuals who “pass” as cisgender and identify within the gender binary 
are conferred the status of persons due to their intelligible gender, while nonbinary transgender 
individuals do not.  However, this would omit a crucial part of the ideology of gender—that it 
supposedly stems from sex categories. 
The gender binary gains its power from the false epistemology where gender derives from 
sex; therefore, trans persons who comply with the gender binary are still ideologically excluded 
from it. Because gender is viewed as a result of biological sex, the gender binary demands that 
those assigned female at birth must identify as women. Catherine Mackinnon writes that 
“masculinity precedes male as femininity precedes female, and male sexual desire defines both. 
Specifically, ‘woman’ is defined by what male desire requires for arousal and satisfaction and is 
socially tautologous with ‘female sexuality’ and ‘the female sex.’”13 Under this view, to be a 
woman is to be an object of heterosexual male desire, and the hegemonic conception of 
heterosexual desire is a procreative one.  
Mackinnon writes that heterosexuality is reliant on the myth that the ultimate purpose of 
sex is procreation. If this is true, trans women are not valid women.14 The purpose of heterosexual 
sex is not procreation however: Mackinnon writes that if it were, “it would not happen every night 
(or even twice a week) for forty or fifty years, nor would prostitutes exist.”15 The existence of trans 
 
13 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1991), 131. 
14 I do not mean to insinuate that straight men cannot or should not be attracted to trans women. I only reference 
widely held ideas about heterosexuality that wrongly exclude trans women from acceptance as “real” women. 
15 Ibid, 133. 
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women, despite their conformity to the category “woman,” still defies the rules of the gender 
binary by disproving the relation between sex and gender. 
Gender nonconforming individuals may or may not be transgender: an individual is gender 
nonconforming if they do not present or behave in accordance with the rules of the gender binary. 
For example, in many ways, lesbians are inherently gender nonconforming because to be a woman, 
according to the rules of the gender binary, is to be attracted to men. However, gender 
nonconformity exists in a multitude of presentations. In an interview with Vice magazine, Doctor 
of Psychology Lou Himes explained gender nonconformity as “‘I am expected to be in this box, 
but I am not going to be in the box because I’m not going to conform to the expectations that are 
set for me.’”16 They also explained that the newness and complexity of these terms is a result of 
these labels emerging out of personal, lived experience. Therefore, it is important to note that while 
I use these terms because they are the most concise way to include most individuals who do not fit 
the script of the cisgender binary, there exist a wealth of identities and individuals that may not fit 
or prefer this label. I acknowledge this shortcoming and only hope that TNBGNC will suffice for 
theoretical purposes.  
The gender of a person  
 Judith Butler addresses the issue of gendered personhood by use of intelligibility. She 
claims that gender is part of a regulatory scheme that informs what is intelligible as a person. 
Furthermore, Butler claims that the conditions for intelligibility as a person are a concern of justice. 
This is because justice does not merely concern how persons are treated, but also (and perhaps 
more importantly) “it concerns consequential decisions about what a person is, and what social 
 
16 Mary Retta, “What's the Difference Between Non-Binary, Genderqueer, and Gender-Nonconforming?,” VICE, 




norms must be honored and expressed for ‘personhood’ to become allocated.”17 Gender is one of 
these social norms that inform the intelligibility of persons: the judgement of someone to be a 
gendered being is prerequisite for judgement of someone to be a person.18 
 Butler claims that the intelligibility of persons is “composed of norms, of practices, that 
have become presuppositional, without which we cannot think the human at all.”19 To be 
conceivable as a person is to be conceivable and intelligible as valid knowledge (knowledge that 
one is, in truth, a person). What we accept as truth, however, is in part reliant upon the social norms 
and dominant standards that govern our ways of knowing. Foucault writes that “nothing can exist 
as an element of knowledge if, on the one hand, it… does not conform to a set of rules and 
constraints characteristic, for example, of a given scientific discourse…and if, on the other hand, 
it does not possess the effects of coercion or simply the incentives peculiar to what is scientifically 
validated or simply rational and generally accepted.”20 In short, that which is accepted as 
knowledge must adhere to the scientific or ideological rules of the times. Gender, as supposed 
derivative of biological sex, which itself is broadly accepted as both scientific truth and general 
knowledge, is one such governing rule which determines what is viable “knowledge”—knowledge 
in this case meaning those who can be known as persons. To be knowable as a person is, in part, 
to be knowable as a gendered individual.   
 Susan Stryker expresses her experience as an unrecognizable person in relation to 
Frankenstein’s monster. She writes “Like the monster, I am too often perceived as less than fully 
human due to the means of my embodiment; like the monster’s as well, my exclusion from human 
 
17 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 58. 
18 Butler uses person and human interchangeably; I use person in all cases for coherence. 
19 Ibid, 58. 
20 Ibid, 27. 
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community fuels a deep and abiding rage in me that I, like the monster, direct against the conditions 
in which I must struggle to exist.”21 Stryker’s comparison between her own transsexual body and 
that of the patchwork-bodied monster echoes the visceral reaction that physically othered 
individuals experience. The villagers’ fear of Dr. Frankenstein’s unnatural monster is founded on 
the departure from categories otherwise known to be unbreakable-- those of life and death, the 
living body and the corpse. Similarly, society rejects those who transition because of “the prospect 
of destabilizing the foundational presupposition of fixed genders upon which a politics of personal 
identity depends.”22 Frankenstein’s monster is unintelligible as a person, despite his capacity for 
reason and self-reflection that philosophers traditionally use to define personhood. The monster’s 
existence resists intelligibility, and therefore is doomed to be rejected. In the same way, Stryker 
claims that her existence, because it defies rules that are generally accepted to be irrefutable truth, 
faces a similar reaction.  
Lori Watson discusses the difference between the subordination of women and the 
subordination of gender-nonconforming individuals with regard to the eligibility for personhood 
that each group possesses. Standards for gender conformity harm both women and TNBGNC 
individuals; however, Watson claims that “unlike those drawing on misogynist ideology to punish 
women for ‘stepping out of line’ …the hostile enforcer of gender conformity relies on the ideology 
of gender binarism to insist that the gender non‐conforming person is entitled to no space, no place, 
no existential entitlement.”23 Women already are persons due to the alignment of the gender 
woman with the gender binary. Therefore, the fundamental difference between misogyny and anti-
 
21 Susan Stryker, Stephen Whittle, and Susan Stryker, “My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of 
Chamounix,” in The Transgender Studies Reader (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), pp. 244-256, 245. 
22 Ibid, 245. 
23 Lori Watson, “Gender Policing: Comments on Down Girl,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101, no. 
1 (July 12, 2020): pp. 236-241, 240. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12699.  
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TNBGNC sentiment is that while women are punished if they are not the good, gendered persons 
that they should be, gender nonconforming individuals are punished because their nonconformity 
allows them no space as persons. Eligibility for personhood, derived from intelligibility within the 
gender binary, is what distinguishes these kinds of subordination. 
Kinship and Personhood  
 Further elucidation is required: it is one thing to claim that gender is an essential organizer 
of thought about persons and another to prove it. Let us examine kinship to do so. I start here 
because kinship is perhaps one of the oldest structuring institutions in society. Elizabeth Freeman 
writes that “In state-centered societies, kinship consists of the social policies that recognize some 
forms of lived relationality– those extending from the heterosexual couple and the parent–child 
unit.”24 Throughout history, kinship has functioned as a defining quality of the person: social rank, 
property rights, duty, social inclusion, naming are just some of its consequences. Freeman argues 
that the genderedness of kinship is essential to its role in constructing the person.  
 The notion of kinship aligns with the gender binary and heterocompulsive model of society 
because they mutually construct one another. Kinship, because it is understood as a product of 
biological reproduction, necessarily upholds dominant ideas about gender: if people are born 
because they have a mother and a father, then to be a person is to be a product of normative gender 
relationships. In turn, dominant ideas about gender regulate what can be seen as valid kinship: 
Freeman writes that “Heterosexual gender norms therefore “make” kin relations, in that they 
regulate human behavior toward procreation while appearing to be the result of some primal 
need.”25 
 
24 Elizabeth Freeman, “Queer Belongings:  
Kinship Theory and Queer Theory,” in A Companion to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Studies, 
ed. Molly McGarry and George Haggerty (John Wiley & Sons, 2008), pp. 295-314, 295. 
25 Ibid, 297. 
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Kinship is the cultural answer to procreation in that it is entailed in biological reproduction 
of human beings and also social construction of persons. According to Freeman, “kinship makes 
bodies not only (or not even primarily) through procreation, but also through the process of 
gendering them.”26 Because heterosexuality enforces (and relies upon) the genderedness of sex, 
kinship-as-reproduction necessarily includes heterosexuality. Although TNBGNC individuals can 
(in some states) and do marry and have children, kinship-as-reproduction limits possibilities for 
queer inclusion. Freeman writes that “the terms for descent tend to draw not only upon the 
dominant lexicon of kinship but also upon kinship’s most conservative meanings and functions.”27 
The importance of lines of biological descent, the gendered expectations in traditional parenting, 
and even the way we understand names to pass down from parent to child are reflections of 
lingering heterocompulsive expectations in kinship. This, Freeman claims, renders whatever 
connections are made and relationships formed in queer social structures “unintelligible as 
kinship.”28 
In many ways, kinship both creates and defines persons. What then, if a trans woman 
cannot biologically mother children? What if a homosexual couple cannot? What, even, if the 
kinship-as-gendering-force “fails” to produce a gender-compliant child? These are all problems 
that arise when negotiating personhood via kinship with TNBGNC individuals. The connections 





26 Ibid, 301. 
27 Ibid, 297. 
28 Ibid, 298. 
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Capitalism and personhood 
There are other ways in which gender has been essential in conceptualizing the person. 
Some feminist theorists have criticized the capitalist on the basis that the inherent genderedness of 
the laborer subordinates women. I argue that this subordination extends to all non-cisgender men 
and contributes to the genderedness of personhood as a whole.  
Social contract theory, which lies at the heart of liberal states, relies on the conception of 
persons as “independent, self-interested or mutually disinterested individuals.”29 This theory of the 
person leads to the social contract mode of society: wherein these mutually disinterested persons 
can use reason to choose to enter in contracts, which is fundamental to the free-market economy. 
Thus, the capitalist economic structure is supposedly a logical result of fundamental truths about 
human nature.  
 Virginia Held argues that this ideological framework is exclusionary, and that it relies on 
an untrue assumption about human nature. Held claims that using the idea of the rational, self-
interested contractor as representative of humanity limits the conception of the ideal person to the 
economic man. The economic man is not limited by responsibilities to children and is not burdened 
by domestic labor; he is defined only by his independence and his ability to contract with other 
economic men for personal gain. Gendered society allows him to focus solely on economic 
participation while his wife cooks dinner and cares for his children. Held writes that to consider 
the economic man the ideal person is “to overlook or to discount in very fundamental ways the 
experience of women.”30     Held writes that as social contract theory was developed, and therefore 
the conceptualization of the ideal person in contractual society, it was never applied to women, 
 
29 Virginia Held, “Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View,” in Arguing about Political Philosophy, ed. Matt 
Zwolinski (Vancouver, BC: Access and Diversity, Crane Library, University of British Columbia, 2015), pp. 70-85, 
70. 
30 Ibid, 71.   
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who were constrained to the private sphere of domestic life in the time of Hobbes and Locke. 
Women simply could not be economic men; they could not be ideal persons. 
Furthermore, because the social contract theory is reliant on assumed truths about the 
person, it is extended to areas of life “not hitherto thought of in contractual terms.”31 This extension 
of contractual thought to areas such as morality, parenting, punishment, and health demonstrates 
just how pervasive the concept person-as-independent-contractor (or person as economic man) is.  
To recap: the structure of the liberal state relies on a conception of the person-as-economic 
man. To claim that persons are most importantly rational, independent contractors excludes those 
who do not fall into the category “man.” Historically, this has led to the exclusion of women from 
full participation in contractual society: philosophers whose contributions to social contract theory 
still govern contemporary political discussions often explicitly stated the necessity of female 
subordination. Held writes that this view genders the distinct public and private domains, with 
“complete freedom and equality in the exclusively male polity; absolute male authority and female 
submission in the household,”32 with the household being the only domain in which women ought 
to participate at all. 
Advances in women's rights and increases in women’s participation in the public domain 
do not and cannot erase the binary construction of such spheres upon which social contract theory 
relies. The conception of the person-as-economic man and the gendered division of public and 
private domains are integral to the ideological foundations of capitalism, and therefore personhood 
under capitalism reinforces the gender binary. Where personhood is reliant on the gender binary, 
the rules and norms of gender apply, and although policies may have evolved, when cultural 
 
31 Ibid, 70. 
32 Ibid, 73. 
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expectations about femininity and masculinity dominate ideas about work and economic 
participation, those who do not conform to that binary are left placeless. 
Religion and personhood 
Christianity, as the dominant religious force in the West, has shaped the concept of 
personhood like no other institution; both the sociocultural traditions in Christianity and the official 
documents and statements place gender as central to the Christian person. For the purposes of this 
paper, I focus on Catholic actions specifically: to recount all actions of the Christian subordination 
and exclusion of TNBGNC individuals would take up the entirety of this project. 
 The Second Vatican Council stated that “though made of body and soul, man is one.”33 
This statement and others like it are used to promote a biological essentialist ideology—one that 
denies the validity of TNBGNC individuals on the basis that binary sex categories make the person. 
The Vatican Congregation on Catholic education released a document in 2019 entitled 
“Male and Female He created Them.” The title alone implies pre-social sex categories as integral 
to God’s creation (i.e., persons). The document states that “Gender theory (especially in its most 
radical forms) speaks of a gradual process of denaturalization [sic], that is a move away from 
nature and towards an absolute option for the decision of the feelings of the human subject.”34 Not 
only does the document erroneously regard the gender/sex binary as natural (natural here meaning 
by God’s design and therefore ultimately true), but it implies that anyone who deviates from it is 
acting upon “a confused concept of freedom in the realm of feelings and wants…as opposed to 
anything based on the truths of existence.”35 The reiteration of gender theory as a deviation from 
 
33 Guiseppe Versaldi and Angelo Vincenzo Zani, eds., “‘Male and Female He Created Them’ Towards a Path of 
Dialogue on the Question of Gender Theory in Education,” Congregation for Catholic Education (Vatican City, 
2019), 12. 
34 Ibid, 11. 
35 Ibid, 11. 
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the natural and the existentially true enforces the claim that binary sex (and its consequent binary 
genders) are the real truth, the reality of the human person.  
At the 1995 United Nations conference on the status of women, the Vatican opposed the 
use of gender when describing persons, preferring only to refer to sex categories. Furthermore, 
when lesbian rights were to be discussed, the Vatican opposed any mention of them, on account 
of lesbians being “anti-human.”36 The sentiment that lesbians are unhuman is rooted in the gender 
rules of femininity: to be a woman is to have sex with men.  While the Church may attribute this 
belief to the “human dignity in sexual distinctiveness and the personal nature of the generation of 
new life,”37 in the words of Mackinnon, if sexual intercourse were a function of reproduction, “it 
would not happen every night (or even twice a week) for forty or fifty years, nor would prostitutes 
exist.”38  
Although there exist some positive statements from officials within the Catholic church 
that denounce discrimination on the basis of sexuality or gender identity, it nonetheless remains 
that at the highest ideological level, Catholicism’s contributions to hegemonic personhood are 
primarily exclusive of TNBGNC individuals. 
Exclusion of TNBGNC folks as a reflection their non-personhood status 
 
Here, examples of TNBGNC oppression and exclusion are given as support for the above 
claims. I will demonstrate that acts of violence and oppression against TNBGNC individuals are 
not merely results of individual prejudices, but rather are direct consequences of TNBGNC non-
personhood.  
 
36 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 190 
37 Guiseppe Versaldi and Angelo Vincenzo Zani, eds., “‘Male and Female He Created Them’ Towards a Path of 
Dialogue on the Question of Gender Theory in Education,” Congregation for Catholic Education (Vatican City, 
2019), 12. 




Personhood affords those who qualify for it certain inalienable rights by law. While one 
might argue that TNBGNC individuals are still citizens, eligible to vote here in the US, there are 
copious examples of how they do not possess the same legal rights as full, gender-compliant 
persons. Take, for example, a recent bill passed by the Florida House Senate. This bill, deceivingly 
called the “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act” allows for verification of biological sex in order to 
play in gendered sports: essentially, if a youth is suspected to be transgender, they may be subject 
to genital examination to play in the sport of their gender.39 This is state sanctioned sexual assault 
of children, specifically transgender children and those suspected of being trans. Cisgender and 
gender conforming individuals, on account of their inclusion in personhood, are not subject to 
genital examination in grade school: they have the right of privacy and bodily autonomy. 
Evidently, TNBGNC children do not.  
This bill is one of many being considered in several states. In fact, recent years have marked 
unprecedented anti-trans legislation in the United States.40 Furthermore, bills like these do much 
more than harm trans youth. Women athletes of color are often perceived as too masculine (and 
even accused of being men in disguise)41 on account of the racist standards of femininity: the 
colonial construction of gender holds whiteness and Eurocentric features central to femininity. 
Therefore, when laws allow the policing of gender conformity in schools, not only are TNBGNC 
students put at risk, but students of color are at risk for racist harassment by school officials.  
 
39 Fairness in Women's Sports Act. Bill (2021).  
40 Wyatt Ronan, “2021 Becomes Record Year For Anti-Trans Legislation,” HRC, March 13, 2021, 
https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/breaking-2021-becomes-record-year-for-anti-transgender-legislation. 
41 Serena Williams is one of many Black women athletes whose talent and success has been targeted by such racist 
accusations: Imdb even has a page for a 2014 documentary titled “Irrefutable proof that Serena Williams is a Man.” 
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Athletics is just one part of a multifaceted attack on trans rights. The ACLU is calling 2021 
a record breaking year for anti-trans legislation: as of April 2021, thirty three states have introduced 
over 100 bills that aim to restrict the rights of transgender individuals, from access to healthcare, 
use of bathrooms, access to gender affirming healthcare, and more.42 Furthermore, according to 
medical professionals, these bills are expected to disproportionately affect trans youth, “a group 
that researchers and medical professionals warn is already susceptible to high rates of suicide and 
depression.”43  When anti-trans legislation is passed without regard for its life threatening 
consequences, not only are the rights to privacy and bodily autonomy of transgender individuals 
restricted, but their very right to life is disputed. The core of our conception of personhood is that 
persons deserve to live: the life of a person contains inherent value. The legislation that disregards 
the lives of TNBGNC individuals is utmost evidence of their systemic exclusion from personhood. 
Legislation is not the only reflection of TNBGNC exclusion and oppression on account of 
their non-person status. Butler writes “The particular sociality that belongs to bodily life, to sexual 
life, and to becoming gendered (which is always, to a certain extent, becoming gendered for others) 
establishes a field of ethical enmeshment with others.”44 For Butler, existing in a gendered world 
and being intelligible as a gendered person is fundamental to establishing connection or 
community with others. Because becoming gendered is a condition for association with others, 
gender-compliant persons are entitled to association, which Butler argues is a condition for 
freedom.45 Thus, those who are unintelligible within the gender binary—whether they are gender 
nonconforming, nonbinary, or transgender, are socially limited to a point of unfreedom.    
 
42 Priya Krishnakumar, “This Record-Breaking Year for Anti-Transgender Legislation Would Affect Minors the 
Most,” CNN (Cable News Network, April 15, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 25 




Because of the ways that personhood as we know it has been constructed and the intrinsic 
notion of gender in this hegemonic personhood, it is evident that TNBGNC individuals are not 
included in personhood on account of their unintelligibility within the gender binary. What then? 
The question arises whether it is possible to expand our notions of personhood in a more inclusive 
fashion. Personhood as a concept is essential to our legal and social systems; therefore, eliminating 
our concept of it would be unproductive and perhaps impossible. The straightforward solution, 
then, would be to eliminate the association of the gender binary with personhood.  However, I 
suspect that the legitimacy of gender is tied to its association with personhood. If the gender binary 
gains its power from its supposed derivation from biological sex categories and therefore is 
understood as a facet of human nature, then to eliminate gender from personhood would contradict 
personhood’s very nature: that it is overwhelmingly human. Our understanding of gender is 
irrevocably tied to our understanding of what it is to be human- what it is to be desired, to be 
recognized, to be mourned.46 If gender and personhood mutually reinforce one another, perhaps 
our only option is to eliminate gender as we know it. How to eliminate gender, what consequences 
its elimination would have, and whether its elimination is feasible is a question for another paper. 
The intricacies of sexual attraction, the reality of gender euphoria, and the deep rootedness of 
gender in all facets of life make its elimination a complex endeavor. 
Whether abolition or reform is the better approach to gender equity, possibility for a more 
just conception of personhood is crucial. Butler writes that “possibility is not a luxury; it is crucial 
as bread. I think we should not underestimate what the thought of the possible does for those for 
whom the issue of survival is the most urgent.”47 Beginning to question the legitimacy of the 
 
46 Ibid, 8. 
47 Ibid, 29. 
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binary, the legitimacy of that which for so long has been held to be irrefutable truth, is the very 
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